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REGULATING THE POWER SHIFT:
THE STATE, CAPITAL AND ELECTRICITY
PRIVATISATION IN AUSTRALIA

Damien Cahill and Sharon Beder

In 1990, British political economist Grahame Thompson observed:
One of the most remarkable features of the ‘conservative turn’
experienced in the UK since 1980 is the paradoxical emergence
of extensive reregulation of economic activity in a period
supposedly typified by drastic deregulation. (Thompson, 1990:
135)

Thompson’s comments point to one of the central, but least understood,
contradictions of neo-liberalism: that a system which is justified on the
premise of a withdrawal of state intervention in the economy has entailed
an active role for the state in its implementation and maintenance. This
article examines the realities of neo-liberalism in practice through an
analysis of the history and experience of electricity privatisation in
Australia. Such realities are contrasted with common assumptions made
about neo-liberalism by both its advocates and some of its opponents.
The case of electricity privatisation, it is argued, highlights not only the
failure of neo-liberalism to deliver its promised benefits, but also the
centrality of the capitalist state and class conflict to the dynamics of neoliberalism in practice. We therefore reject the ‘withering away of the
state’ approach to understanding neo-liberalism. In doing this we are
contributing to a critique of the role of capital and the state in neoliberalism.
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Neo-liberalism, Capital and the State
According to neo-liberal theory, ‘markets’, when freed from state
interference, are the most efficient, and most moral, way of providing
goods and services in society. Although most neo-liberals admit a limited
role for the state in enforcing the rule of law and, sometimes, in
providing a ‘safety net’, they nonetheless argue for a severe reduction in
the state provision of services such as education and health care, and a
dismantling of regulations limiting corporate powers. Through
privatisation, deregulation and marketisation, argue neo-liberals, a more
prosperous and more free, although not necessarily a more equal, society
will eventuate. For neo-liberals it is not only the scope of government
activity that must be reduced, but the size of government as well. Neoliberals therefore call for significant cuts to state spending.
Over the last twenty years, the neo-liberal philosophy has come to
dominate policy making in Australia and stands as the dominant
ideological frame through which society is understood within the media,
the bureaucracy and political elites. Australian scholars have produced
many valuable critiques of both the theory and practice of neo-liberalism
– or ‘economic rationalism’ with which it is synonymous (Argy, 1998;
Bell, 1997; Carroll & Manne, 1992; Fairbrother, Svensen & Teicher,
1997a; Pusey, 1991; Quiggin, 1996; Rees, Ridley & Stilwell, 1993;
Sawer, 1982; Self, 1993; Stretton & Orchard, 1994). These have tended
to detail the inability of neo-liberal markets to deliver socially just
outcomes and the ideological dogmatism inherent in neo-liberal theory.
Implicit in the language, if not the actual analysis of a number of these
critiques, however, is the notion that neo-liberalism entails a ‘withering
away of the state’ (Fairbrother, Teciher & Svensen, 1997b), a ‘retreat of
the state’ (Quiggin, 1996: 26) or ‘small government’ (Argy, 1998: 8087). Such assumptions are mirrored by critiques of neo-liberalism
internationally, with Susan Strange’s (1996) The Retreat of the State
being perhaps the best known example.
Yet, there is a growing body of literature which recognises the central
role played by the state and capital in constructing, regulating and
maintaining a neo-liberal economy in Australia and elsewhere in the
world. There are two main aspects to this critique. The first is the
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recognition that neo-liberalism did not simply arise organically out of the
crisis of the Keynesian welfare state1 from the 1970s onwards (see for
example Arrighi, 2002). Rather, the economic crisis of the 1970s
provided the context for a mobilisation by particular fractions of capital
in an attempt to shape state policy making in their own interests. In
Australia, for example, Bell (1997: 81, 116-7) has written of a ‘neoliberal coalition’ and Kaptein (1993: 103) of a ‘neo-liberal power bloc’
which brought together leading fractions of Australian capital and which
actively pursued the dismantling of the key institutions and social truths
underpinning the Australian Settlement – tariff protections and
arbitration – as well as those underpinning Australia’s post-war
Keynesian welfare state. This was not merely a mobilisation aimed at
increasing capital’s profitability, it was also an attempt to diminish the
power of organised labour which had been bolstered in the post-war
years by full employment and, in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, by
militant unionism. This is captured by Berger who argues, ‘a defining
characteristic of the rise of neo-liberalism has been an historic victory of
capital over labour’ (Berger, 1999: 453).
The second aspect of this critique is a recognition of the role of the
capitalist state in the construction and maintenance of neo-liberalism.
Partly this stems from an appreciation of centrality of the state to the
reproduction of capitalist economic relations in general. As Bell states,
‘the neoliberal concept of a ‘free market’ is a contradiction in terms:
markets are always and everywhere artefacts of state power and
regulatory capacity’ (Bell, 1997: 258). Neo-liberals, and some of their
critics, fail to understand this. As Jessop writes, ‘the capital relation
cannot be reproduced entirely through market exchange’ (Jessop, 2002:
18). The state is crucial for providing the framework within which
1

The terms 'Keynesian welfare state' and 'Keynesian social democracies' are used
here as shorthand for a range of policies, institutions and social relations which
coincided during the post-war years in many western capitalist democracies. This
is not to deny the particularities of national configurations. Australia, for example,
had a far less comprehensive welfare state system than did Britain or Sweden, with
the wages system serving as the primary vehicle for redistribution, and can thus be
described as a 'residual' welfare system (see Castles, 1985). Nor is this to suggest a
direct correlation between the economic prescriptions advocated by Keynes, and
the macro-economic policies which bore his name (for a discussion of this issue in
the Australian context see Battin, 1997).
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capitalist relations can exist through such activities as the provision of
infrastructure, the regulation of markets, the maintenance of ‘social
cohesion’ (Jessop, 2002: 21) or the correction of ‘market failure’ (Jessop,
2002: 41). Even a pluralist such as Charles Lindblom argues that the state
must ‘induce’ business to perform its role in capitalist society (Lindblom,
1977: 173-4). Radical neo-liberal ideology is blind to this because it is an
idealist form of bourgeois individualism – what Evan Jones calls ‘idealist
economics’ (Jones, 2000). It misunderstands and mystifies capitalist
social relations at the same time as deifying them.
The recognition that the state is central to neo-liberalism stems also from
observation of neo-liberalism in practice. It was primarily through the
capitalist state that the institutions and ideologies underpinning
Keynesian social democracies were dismantled, and it has been through
the capitalist state that neo-liberalism has been maintained and extended.
Albo captures the essence of this when he writes:
it is entirely misleading to see neoliberalism as an attack on the
state in favor of the market, or as a hollowing out of the state to
the global and local, or a bypassing of the state by corporate
power. Neoliberalism has operated through the institutions of the
nation-state (Albo, 2002: 51).

A number of Australian scholars have recognised this point. Tim
Anderson, for example, argues that contrary to neo-liberal rhetoric, neoliberalism in practice has meant:
a market re-regulation to guarantee new and profitable markets to
large corporations, and a social re-regulation to restrict the
meaning of citizenship, where this conflicts with the delivery of
profitable markets to large corporations (Anderson, 1999: 18).

Frank Stilwell argues that:
In practice, the policies [of neo-liberalism] have been less about
‘slimming the state’ than about aiming the state more directly to
serve the interests of capital, and the financial sector in particular.
(Stilwell, 2000: 52).
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Similarly, Dick Bryan states that neo-liberalism has entailed ‘an explicit
agenda to enforce the power of capital’ (Bryan, 2000: 345). Following
from these critiques we understand neo-liberalism as a new ‘mode of
regulation’ (Jessop, 2002) that seeks to overturn and dismantle the
hegemonies and institutions that constituted the post-war class
compromise, and to further socialise the costs of capitalist profitability.
In doing this neo-liberalism entails a deepening of the processes of
commodification, a transfer of power from labour to capital, and a
transfer of resources from public to private. Using electricity
privatisation as a case study, the remainder of this article builds upon
such critiques to present a fuller picture of actually existing neoliberalism than is offered by neo-liberalism’s advocates or by adherents
to the ‘withering away of the state’ thesis.

Making the case for Electricity Privatisation in Australia
Electricity privatisation in Australia did not arise out of popular struggles
or discontent. Rather, leading fractions of capital played a key role in
advocating and supporting privatisation, particularly the financial
markets, the media and energy intensive industries (Kelly, 1992: 224).
The Business Council of Australia (BCA) ‘played a prominent role’ in
electricity reform in Australia. It formed an Electricity Task Force to
‘provide a leadership role to support and achieve reforms in the
electricity industry, thereby assisting Australian enterprises in becoming
internationally competitive’ (Daniels, 1993: 67). The BCA persuaded the
government to direct the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) to
undertake a series of studies identifying the costs of infrastructure
services such as electricity, comparing their performance with the best
overseas, and publishing the comparisons regularly. The BCA committed
‘considerable financial and personnel resources’ to this benchmarking
exercise as well as associated studies (Daniels, 1993: 60, 63).
Not surprisingly, the BCA-funded studies found some gaps between the
performance of Australian services and the best around the world. Nor is
it surprising that the BCA recommended that government services be
exposed to more competition from the private sector ‘by removing the
monopoly powers of government business enterprises and other barriers
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to competition’ (Daniels, 1993: 66-7) and that some of these enterprises
should be divested to the private sector where they could be performed
more efficiently (Loton, 1993: 4).
Business owners and executives also played a central role in setting up,
funding and promoting think tanks and staffing their boards. These
corporate funded think tanks proliferated in Australia in the 1980s and
1990s and campaigned tirelessly to get privatisation and deregulation
onto the political agenda. During the 1990s they published about 900
reports and discussion papers each year and held some 600 conferences
and symposia (G. Murray & Pacheco, 2001).
Perhaps the most effective instance of this corporate sponsorship of neoliberal opinion was Project Victoria. It was established in 1990 when 13
business organisations commissioned the Tasman Institute and the
Institute for Public Affairs (IPA) to outline a comprehensive neo-liberal
agenda for Victoria. These organisations included the Australian
Chamber of Manufacturers, the BCA, the State Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, the Victorian Employers Federation and the Victorian
Farmers Federation. Project Victoria set the agenda for privatisation and
provided detailed advice on its implementation in Victoria. It covered
water, ports, electricity, public transport and workers compensation. The
Kennett Government implemented most of Project Victoria’s
recommendations after it was elected and in some cases went further,
slashing the public service workforce by more than three times the 1991
report recommendations (Kohler, 1997: 15).
Business was also critical of community service obligations embedded in
the State electricity supply arrangements, including uniform tariffs across
the State to cross-subsidise remote customers and non-statutory
environmental obligations.
According to Project Victoria, these
obligations caused business users to be overcharged by 28% (not
including farmers who were subsidised) and impeded ‘competitiveness
by distorting service provision’ (Moore & Porter, 1991: 4-6).
While such business-funded rhetoric painted a grim picture of the
government-owned electricity industry in Australia, it ignored the real
efficiency improvements that had been taking place under the existing
system. The Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), for example,
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recognised that, when it came to electricity supply, the state authorities
were in fact improving their efficiency and productivity. The Electricity
Commission of NSW had reduced staffing by 30 percent in two years
and the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) had reduced
staffing, cut operating costs, reduced reserve plant margins and cut
average electricity prices by 3 percent a year since 1985 (cited in Access
Economics, 2001: 14). Project Victoria's preliminary report, Victoria:
An Agenda for Change, while noting that the State Electricity
Commission of Victoria (SECV) had been one of the least productive
electricity providers in Australia, admitted that one of the reasons had
been its reliance on low-grade brown coal, which requires a more capital
intensive electricity generation process, and that performance had
improved markedly during the late 1980s (Moore & Porter, 1991: 4-4, 45).
The real reason that business was advocating privatisation had less to do
with efficiency than with undermining union power and shifting some of
the costs of electricity supply onto the householder, thus further
socialising the costs of capitalist profitability. Strikes were frequent in
the industry and demarcation disputes and overstaffing had become a
problem with up to 24 unions covering each power station. However,
these problems were addressed prior to privatisation when unions were
rationalised with the help of the Australian Council of Trade Unions
(ACTU) and employee numbers were reduced from 20,000 to 8000 prior
to privatisation (R. Murray, 1995: 46). In the words of Michael Porter,
head of the neo-liberal Tasman Institute, privatisation would remove ‘the
“ball and chain” and the labour market practices that stop business…
from prospering’. Electricity privatisation was also seen as way of
allowing private firms ‘to get a piece of the action’ (Porter, 2001) by
opening up ready-made monopoly firms for private corporations to
purchase at bargain prices.
Despite the questionable assumptions upon which proponents of
privatisation based their arguments, Commonwealth agencies and some
state governments took up the privatisation baton from business. The
IAC played a key role in influencing and supporting the ‘reform’ process
through its many reports which were widely covered in the media
(Corden, 1994: 112-3). Other supporting agencies included Treasury, the
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Department of Finance, and the Bureasu of Agricultural Economics,
Industry Economics and Labour Market Research (Duncan & McAdam,
1985: 38). Although noting improvements in performance within the
state-owned electricity industry, the IAC did not accept that full
efficiency could be achieved without private ownership. It recommended
that, in advance of privatisation, the public utilities should be
corporatised and that generation, transmission and distribution sectors in
each state should be separated. New investment should be subject to
competitive tender in the private sector. The Commission also proposed
the division of generation capacity into separate competing companies
with open access to the transmission and distribution networks for new
private generating facilities.
These recommendations were endorsed at the 1991 Special Premier’s
Conference. They were also strongly supported by the major
international bureaucracies: the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD.
They were subsequently adopted, first in Victoria and then in other
states. A National Competition Council was set up to oversee the
restructuring process.
Such moves went against the tide of popular sentiment. Privatisation met
with strong community opposition in most states. Public opinion was
clearly against private ownership of electricity. A 1994 Saulwick Age
national poll had found that over two thirds of those surveyed favoured
public ownership; and an EPAC study the same year had also found that
most Australians supported government provision of infrastructure
(Miller, 1995: 6). The initial reluctance of States, other than Victoria, to
privatise government services, because it was politically unpopular, was
overcome by incentive payments of $16 billion from the federal
government. It was only because of ‘intense pressure’ and financial
incentives from the federal government and other states that South
Australia agreed to restructure its electricity industry and then join the
National Electricity Market (NEM) (Booth, 2000: 107-9). The Olsen
government had been re-elected in 1997 after promising not to privatise
its electricity. However, within weeks it reneged and announced the sale.
The business community in South Australia was strongly in favour of
privatisation of electricity but there was also solid community opposition
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and the government lost office at the following election in 2002 (Spoehr,
2000: 16).
State governments found privatisation attractive, despite public opinion,
because it promised a short term influx of money into government
coffers. A primary political motivation for privatisation in the states of
Victoria and South Australia was debt reduction. However, although
state debt fell from $76 billion in 1993 to $47 billion in 1997, taxpayers
were often not any better off, particularly with respect to electricity
privatisations (Leeuwen, 1997: 9).
In the early 1990s the Victorian state government had such a large
government debt ($32 billion) that its credit rating was downgraded by
international rating agencies. Privatisation was supposed to be a way of
reducing the government debt and therefore taxes and charges to
business. In fact the SECV’s debt was not really a problem. In the year
before it was broken up, 1992/3, ‘it paid $995 million in interest, a $191
million dividend to the State Government, and had a profit of $207
million’ (Skulley, 1995: 32).
In South Australia, where electricity privatisation was promoted as a debt
reduction measure, the debt was portrayed as being out of control.
However, the Electricity Trust of South Australia (ETSA) had
contributed some $2 billion dollars to state revenue over the previous
decade and its operating costs had decreased significantly (Kelton &
Wheatley, 2001b: 23). Neo-liberal economist, Richard Blandy, later
confirmed that:
revenues earned by ETSA for the South Australian government
before it was privatised would match, if not exceed, the interest
on South Australian debt retired as a result of ETSA’s sale.
Hence, South Australians now face historically high electricity
prices compared with the rest of Australia for no net benefit to the
state government finances (Blandy, 2002: 11).

This supports John Quiggin's argument that:
The privatisation of the South Australian electricity industry has
reduced the net worth of the public sector … the interest savings
on the sale price will fall consistently short of the earnings
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foregone through privatisation. This is consistent with most
Australian experience of privatisation (Quiggin, 2003: 68).

In summary, electricity privatisation, like neo-liberalism in general, has
been a class-based project through and through – driven by business
interests and state elites and justified on the grounds of small
government, efficiency and debt reduction. The goal of debt reduction
has not been realised, as this capacity has been diminished through the
jettisoning of state-owned revenue sources in the form of electricity
utilities. For capital, the goal has been the transformation of publicly
owned monopolies into private oligopolies, and the reduction of union
power.

Implementing Privatisation - Neoliberalism in Practice
Because electricity is not a commodity that can be easily traded in shops
or on the stock market, the establishment of a wholesale market in
electricity that would foster competition required the creation of a whole
new set of institutions and regulations to ensure supply and demand are
balanced at all times, ancillary services are supplied and maintained, and
incentives exist for investment in new infrastructure (Beder, 2003: 9-11).
Such interventionist state activities fly in the face of neo-liberal rhetoric
about 'small government', but by investigating such regulations it is
possible to advance our understanding of 'actually existing neoliberalism'.
In Victoria the government had to establish a power pool where
wholesale electricity prices would be set according to complex rules. It
mandated that all electricity had to be traded through this power pool. To
help generators and retailers cope with the wildly fluctuating prices of
the pool, a system of vesting contracts was introduced. Drawing on the
UK model, a formula was devised to pay distribution companies based
on the consumer price index.
In the other states, governments restructured their electricity services by
separating generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply and
corporatising the ensuing organisations. Barriers to interstate trade were
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removed and open access for electricity generators to use electricity
networks established. The Commonwealth government set up a partial
national electricity grid covering 7 million customers in Eastern and
Southern Australia by 2001 (Beder, 2003).
The National Electricity Market (NEM) began operations in 1998, with
Victoria, NSW and SA taking part. Queensland later joined and
Tasmania will join when the ‘Basslink’ to the mainland is completed.
The government established a National Electricity Market Management
Company (NEMMCO) to run the NEM — which in turn set up
numerous working groups on things like dispatch, pricing,
interconnection options, plant modelling, reliability, metering, and
security — and a National Electricity Code Administrator (NECA) to
regulate it. NEMMCO has a budget of around $60 million and employs
over 200 staff. The ACCC also has regulatory responsibility over the
industry, as the states have their own regulatory bodies responsible for
the industry.
During 2002 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) conducted
a review of NEM, which identified some deficiencies in the energy
market, including excessive regulation, perceptions of conflict of interest,
excessive generator market power and power pool volatility, fragmented
transmission network planning, and ad hoc responses to greenhouse gas
emissions. To remedy these deficiencies it recommended that a National
Energy Regulator be created in place of the various state regulatory
bodies (COAG, 2002). Thus, the new privatised electricity environment
is underpinned by new and extensive (rather than by a lack of) state
regulatory structures.
Despite the promises of neoliberal advocates, prices went up after
privatisation and deregulation. According to Booth (whose figures are
based upon accounts published annually by the distribution companies
themselves), the distribution companies made huge profits (30 or 40% of
their total revenue) – much higher than have been earned by most listed
companies in Australia (Booth, 2000: 64-8). This has been at the expense
of consumers, and points to the class interests at work in the privatisation
of electricity and, indeed, in the neo-liberal turn more generally.

16

JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY No 55

NEM operated on the same principle as the Victorian power pool which
had been modelled on the now defunct UK power pool. Following the
UK experience, there had been plenty of warnings of the potential for
price manipulation in the national market, and not surprisingly this
occurred in Australia too. Generators were able to withhold capacity on
hot days until the price peaked and they could then rebid their capacity at
inflated prices. Generators admitted that the reason for rebidding was
‘financial optimisation’. Until 2001 electricity prices to households did
not suffer much ‘mainly through tight government controls’. These were
progressively removed after that date as retail markets were opened to
competition and the pain of skyrocketing rates began to be felt (Anon.,
2001: 54; James, 2001b: 19; Sexton, 2001; Wilson, 2001: 8).
After the market had been operating for a few years, price manipulation
was confirmed by a study done by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural
and Resource Economics, a supporter of deregulation and competition in
electricity markets (ABARE, 2002). Whilst prices were initially
manipulated by physical withholding capacity, generators moved to
economic withholding in 2000: that is, bidding large chunks of their
capacity at very high prices (ACCC, 2002: 77-8).
After privatisation the NEM pool prices for SA increased and were much
higher than for other participating states. By 2002 residential rates had
increased by forty percent since 1994, and householders now pay more
for their electricity than anywhere else in Australia, thirty percent more
than in non-privatised NSW (compared with ten percent more preprivatisation and the opening of markets) (Beechey, 2001: 16; Morton,
2000). Clearly then, the effect of electricity privatisation was to secure
greater freedoms – the freedom to set prices and to withhold supply – for
businesses who moved into the electricity market. Prices in the privatised
electricity market have not been competitive, contrary to the predictions
of neo-liberal advocates.
In early 2001 only ten percent of major employers in South Australia had
been able to secure new electricity contracts to cover them when their old
ones expired. Those with new contracts faced heavy price increases
(James, 2001a; Kelton & Wheatley, 2001a: 19; Wilson, 2001: 8). These
large businesses, which originally pushed for privatisation and
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deregulation, found that they were worse off. Spot prices were so high
that:
a new summer pastime has grown in SA called “curtailment”, a
term used to describe a situation where a business might find the
cost of electricity so high they can make more money by shutting
down their operation and on-selling the power they would have
used (Sexton, 2001).

Fuses and transformers across SA failed, and transmission across highvoltage lines was deliberately cut off to avoid potential fires on very hot
days. There were 500 outages in January 2001 alone. Unions claimed
that the 900 workers employed to check and repair powerlines in 1991
had been reduced to about 300, whilst maintenance crews were reduced
from 270 to 90. According to SA auditor-general Ken McPherson, the
leasing arrangements did not require companies leasing generating
facilities to upgrade or even maintain those facilities. Certainly, the
market provided no incentive to do so (Beechey, 2001: 16; Kelton &
Wheatley, 2001b: 23).
As with the infamous example of California, it has become clear that
NEM provides no incentive for generators to invest in new capacity
because undersupply keeps pool prices very high. Having the standby
plant necessary to ensure system reliability ‘erodes generator profit…
Generator profit is inversely proportional to the levels of reserve plant
with no incentive for system reliability’ (Searle, 2001: 24). A rush of
new companies undercutting each other to get customers has not
happened. Rather, as in the US and the UK, the industry is consolidating
amongst existing companies who are seeking to cushion themselves
against market fluctuations and become big enough to avoid competition
(Beder, 2003).
The big users of electricity in Australia — aluminium, cement, paper and
glass — were the consumers that gained most from the ‘reform’ process
during the 1990s before NEM prices began to escalate (Mitchell, 2002:
54). Additionally, aluminium smelters, which consume 16% of all
Australian electricity, have been exempted from having to buy their
electricity from NEM. Because of their strong lobbying, rather than face
the vagaries of the market, they have been guaranteed fixed prices for
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their electricity, which, in effect, are subsidised by other ratepayers
(AAP, 2002: 17). Thus the process of electricity privatisation has
exposed individual consumers to a new electricity market which has
entailed increased costs and reductions in reliability. At the same time,
state intervention has facilitated the emergence of new oligopolies in the
electricity industry, and ensured that major capitalist consumers of
electricity are cushioned from the fluctuations of this new market.
Another major consequence of electricity privatisation has been heavy
job losses. Between the mid 1990s and 2003, nationwide employment in
the sector fell from 83,000 to 33,000 (Wilson, 2003). Not only has this
cut costs for capital, it has also eroded union power – a key objective and
consequence of neo-liberalism. For example, the CFMEU's John
Maitland notes that electricity privatisation has led to the rise of contract
labour in the electricity industry which has undermined union power and
resulted in 'inferior wages and working conditions' (Maitland, 2001).
Furthermore, those communities built around the electricity industry
have been particularly hard hit by electricity privatisation. Victoria's
Latrobe Valley experienced job losses of 16,000 as a result of
privatisation (Halliday, 2000). Such areas have often been centres of
strong union presence and identification. As neo-liberalism restructures
the economic and social geography of such areas, so does it threaten
those features that have been central to union strength. Concurrent with
these job losses was the implementation by the Kennett government of
punitive anti-union legislation, which restricted the rights of workers to
organise collectively (Teicher & Van Gramberg, 1999: 163-7). Rather
than an example of ‘free labour markets’ the Kennett reforms relied upon
the coercive powers of the state to enforce freedoms for capital.

Conclusion
Electricity privatisation and deregulation in Australia have been
encouraged, facilitated and implemented by governments and state
agencies. The costs of the ‘reforms’ have been borne by the electricity
sector workforce, which has been decimated, and by the rural and
residential consumers, who have borne the brunt of the resultant
electricity prices rises. An essential public service has been transferred to

REGULATING THE POWER SHIFT

19

private control in two states, and other states have electricity prices
determined by an electricity market that is subject to price manipulation
by profit-oriented electricity suppliers. Regulatory structures set up to
ensure the smooth running of the market have failed to prevent this price
manipulation or ensure reliability of supply. The winners have been those
corporations able to buy up the former state-owned industries and impose
higher prices on consumers.
Electricity privatisation has thus entailed an interventionist state,
instituting new forms of governance and working aggressively to secure
freedoms for capital. Contrary to the pronouncements of neo-liberals
themselves, neo-liberalism has not heralded a ‘withering away of the
state’. Rather it has resulted in what Andrew Gamble termed ‘the free
economy and the strong state’ (Gamble, 1994). Neo-liberalism does not
deliver the benefits promised by its adherents precisely because of its
class nature.
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